Security

Trust identities, not addresses.

Carrier addresses change and relay IPs can be redirected. Nexus Atlas anchors trust in cryptographic identities while keeping the hosted traversal relay outside the customer payload boundary.

Noise IKX25519ChaCha20-Poly1305
Security model

Three independent trust decisions.

The control plane publishes availability. The signed map authenticates that publication. Each relay then proves the static identity named by the map.

01

Endpoint identity

Atlas peers authenticate their static keys through the tunnel handshake. A changing carrier address does not change who the node is.

02

Relay identity

Every relay uses a pinned static key. Redirecting its IP is insufficient to impersonate the server.

03

Map authority

The relay map is Ed25519-signed with an offline key and checked against the public key built into Atlas.

Metadata boundary

What a hosted traversal relay can—and cannot—observe.

“Encrypted” should not be used as a substitute for a precise data-boundary explanation.

The relay can observe

  • Outer source address and port
  • Authenticated node identity
  • Destination node identity
  • On a relay-to-relay path, the relay that handed over the frame
  • Session timing and liveness
  • Forwarded byte counters

The relay cannot observe

  • Inner IP packets
  • Application payloads
  • Video or sensor contents
  • Command-and-control messages
  • Decrypted Atlas tunnel traffic
Exit boundary

An exit is the far end of the tunnel, not a relay.

A hosted exit carries a device’s traffic on to the internet. How hosted exits are chosen

  • It decrypts the traffic it carries to the internet.So it sees what any internet gateway sees — destination addresses, timing and volume, and the contents of anything not protected by its own encryption, such as TLS.
  • Relays stay outside the payload; an exit is inside it by definition.Which is why private estates can run their own.
Hop honesty

Who holds the keys on each path.

“Encrypted” means something different on each path a session can take. Each row states who can open the payload.

PathWho holds keys to the payloadStated precisely
Direct, node to nodeThe two endpointsEnd-to-end encrypted under the pair’s Noise session.
One hosted relayThe two endpoints; the relay carries opaque envelopesThe relay forwards opaque encrypted envelopes addressed by static key; it authenticates clients but holds no key that opens what it forwards.
Federated relaysThe two endpoints; both relays carry opaque envelopesEach node stays on the relay nearest to it, and the two relays carry the frame between them in exactly one hop, over a session keyed from the signed relay map. A node takes this path only with end-to-end sealing on, unless an operator explicitly allows plain forwarding. Neither relay holds a key that opens what it forwards.
Mesh-forwarded through your fleet, end-to-end sealing off (the default)Every hopEach leg has its own Noise session: a forwarding node decrypts, makes the forwarding decision, and re-encrypts toward the next hop. Forwarders are trusted, authenticated members of your own fleet.
Mesh-forwarded, end-to-end sealing onThe two endpointsThe source seals each unicast packet to its destination before it leaves; forwarding nodes carry the sealed envelope and can neither read nor alter it. Broadcast, multicast and the FEC class keep the per-hop model.
Interconnect seamThe seam hostThe seam host is a member of both networks; payloads sealed end to end are opened and re-sealed there.
Served LANThe serving nodeTraffic crosses the mesh like any member’s and leaves the tunnel at the serving node as plain IP on the LAN, so that node, like any gateway, sees it in the clear.
Exit, hosted or privateThe exitThe exit is the far end of the tunnel: it decrypts the traffic it carries to the internet.

The mechanics behind the relay and mesh rows are in the hop table on the engineering site; how each mode carries a session is on Relay modes.

Control-plane resilience

A directory outage does not become a tunnel outage.

Atlas separates discovery from ongoing data-plane operation and retains a last-known-good trust anchor locally.

01

Outside-in verify

A relay is tested from outside before the control plane publishes it.

02

Sign offline

Canonical relay-map data is signed by a key that is not available to the serving control plane.

03

Cache verified

Clients store the last valid map and reject older signed maps as rollbacks.

04

Authenticate relay

The selected address must still prove possession of the relay identity named in the map.

Scope note. This page describes hosted Nexus Atlas Traversal relays, which forward opaque Atlas datagrams. Atlas multi-hop mesh routing is a separate forwarding mode, hop by hop by default and sealed end to end with end-to-end sealing on; the table above states the trust boundary of each.
Get early access

Bring us the network you cannot control.

Apply as a pilot partner if you have a deployment ready to test, or start evaluating Nexus Atlas Traversal as a future customer. Tell us enough to understand the endpoints, carriers, regions, and operational constraints involved.

01

Pilot partner

Run an early deployment with direct engineering contact and help shape priorities through real-world feedback.

02

Customer evaluation

Research architecture, security, deployment options, and commercial fit before committing to a pilot.

Already enrolled? Open the console
Early-access applicationUsually answered by the product team

Your application is sent to the Nexus Atlas product team. You can also email office@nexusatlas.io.