Endpoint identity
Atlas peers authenticate their static keys through the tunnel handshake. A changing carrier address does not change who the node is.
Carrier addresses change and relay IPs can be redirected. Nexus Atlas anchors trust in cryptographic identities while keeping the hosted traversal relay outside the customer payload boundary.
The control plane publishes availability. The signed map authenticates that publication. Each relay then proves the static identity named by the map.
Atlas peers authenticate their static keys through the tunnel handshake. A changing carrier address does not change who the node is.
Every relay uses a pinned static key. Redirecting its IP is insufficient to impersonate the server.
The relay map is Ed25519-signed with an offline key and checked against the public key built into Atlas.
“Encrypted” should not be used as a substitute for a precise data-boundary explanation.
A hosted exit carries a device’s traffic on to the internet. How hosted exits are chosen
“Encrypted” means something different on each path a session can take. Each row states who can open the payload.
| Path | Who holds keys to the payload | Stated precisely |
|---|---|---|
| Direct, node to node | The two endpoints | End-to-end encrypted under the pair’s Noise session. |
| One hosted relay | The two endpoints; the relay carries opaque envelopes | The relay forwards opaque encrypted envelopes addressed by static key; it authenticates clients but holds no key that opens what it forwards. |
| Federated relays | The two endpoints; both relays carry opaque envelopes | Each node stays on the relay nearest to it, and the two relays carry the frame between them in exactly one hop, over a session keyed from the signed relay map. A node takes this path only with end-to-end sealing on, unless an operator explicitly allows plain forwarding. Neither relay holds a key that opens what it forwards. |
| Mesh-forwarded through your fleet, end-to-end sealing off (the default) | Every hop | Each leg has its own Noise session: a forwarding node decrypts, makes the forwarding decision, and re-encrypts toward the next hop. Forwarders are trusted, authenticated members of your own fleet. |
| Mesh-forwarded, end-to-end sealing on | The two endpoints | The source seals each unicast packet to its destination before it leaves; forwarding nodes carry the sealed envelope and can neither read nor alter it. Broadcast, multicast and the FEC class keep the per-hop model. |
| Interconnect seam | The seam host | The seam host is a member of both networks; payloads sealed end to end are opened and re-sealed there. |
| Served LAN | The serving node | Traffic crosses the mesh like any member’s and leaves the tunnel at the serving node as plain IP on the LAN, so that node, like any gateway, sees it in the clear. |
| Exit, hosted or private | The exit | The exit is the far end of the tunnel: it decrypts the traffic it carries to the internet. |
The mechanics behind the relay and mesh rows are in the hop table on the engineering site; how each mode carries a session is on Relay modes.
Atlas separates discovery from ongoing data-plane operation and retains a last-known-good trust anchor locally.
A relay is tested from outside before the control plane publishes it.
Canonical relay-map data is signed by a key that is not available to the serving control plane.
Clients store the last valid map and reject older signed maps as rollbacks.
The selected address must still prove possession of the relay identity named in the map.
Apply as a pilot partner if you have a deployment ready to test, or start evaluating Nexus Atlas Traversal as a future customer. Tell us enough to understand the endpoints, carriers, regions, and operational constraints involved.
Run an early deployment with direct engineering contact and help shape priorities through real-world feedback.
Research architecture, security, deployment options, and commercial fit before committing to a pilot.